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Abstract
The paper investigates how Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs)
a ect the range of goods exported by a nation. We use the Melitz
model and highly dis-aggregated data on Euro-Mediterranean trade to
measure the e ect of preferential trade liberalization on the range of
traded products. By focusing on the zeros in the trade matrix, the
paper ﬁnds evidence that at the time when the Euro-Mediterranean
FTA started there was an expansion in the range of products traded
by its members.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F15, F13, F14
Keywords: economic integration, trade policy, country and industry stud-
ies of trade.
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useful and helpful discussions.1 Introduction
The hypothesis that Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) force developing
countries to specialize in some goods is widespread among policy makers.
Since most developing countries are interested in expanding the range of
goods that they export, the possibility that such hypothesis could be true
may be preventing some developing nations from signing Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTAs).
But, is it true that preferential liberalization constrains the range of
exported products? Early trade models such as those by Helpman and
Krugman (1987) imply that big markets produce lots of varieties and all
of them are sold to all markets. Countries, however, do not export all
goods that they produce. Only a handful of goods are traded internationally
because most ﬁrms are not engaged in international trade; they sell only in
their local markets. In the old days, trade theory used to ignore the fact
that trade barriers could a ect the number of goods exported by a nation.
It was thought that the basic determinants of the zeros and the trade ﬂows
were the same. This means that we cannot use the “new trade theory” to
explain changes in the number of traded varieties.
One inﬂuential paper that helps us address this question is Melitz (2003).
The model has much in common with earlier trade models, but there are
some key innovations that allow us to deal with heterogeneous ﬁrms – some
export and some do not. The two new elements in the “new-new trade
theory” are ﬁxed cost of entering a new market, and di erences in ﬁrm’s
marginal production costs. The “new goods hypothesis” has been the sub-
ject of work by Baldwin and Taglioni (2004) in the context of currency
unions.
The purpose of the paper is twofold. We present a generic framework
based on the Melitz model that uses highly disaggregated data to look for
a new range of exported products in a preferential trade liberalization pro-
cess between developed and developing nations (e.g. North-South). We
then turn to look for empirical evidence in the Euro-Mediterranean FTA.
We investigate whether the Euro-Mediterranean agreements (Euro-Med, for
short) have expanded the range of products traded among its members. This
is an important issue for the Mediterranean countries because they may be
hoping the trade agreements will expand the range of goods that they trade.
We organized the paper as follows: section 2 presents the theoreti-
1cal framework used to investigate whether Preferential Trade Agreements
(PTAs) generate trade in new products. In section 3 we introduce the data
set; we present some prima facie evidence of the Euro-Med generating trade
in new goods. In section 4 we turn to the formal empirical analysis. We
use gravity equations to estimate trade ﬂows. Section 5 deals with some of
the puzzles. We conclude in section 6 summarizing the main ﬁndings of the
paper and providing some avenues for future research.
2 Theory
We propose a framework based on Melitz (2003).1 In this setting, ﬁrms try
to have large enough sales to make it proﬁtable to cover the sunk costs of
entering foreign markets. The range of ﬁrms that export is endogenously
determined and related to native ﬁrm-level productivity; as a result large
ﬁrms export while small ﬁrms do not.
The equilibrium in nation-o (origin) is characterized by one cut-o  con-
dition for each market, including its own. The domestic cut-o  condition
deﬁnes the highest marginal cost for which nation-o ﬁrms still ﬁnd it worth-
while to produce; ﬁrms with marginal costs above the threshold do not ﬁnd








1     1
 1  
(1)
where FD
o stands for the cost of entering the domestic market, Bo is the
demand shifter in nation-o,   is the elasticity of substitution, which we
assume to be constant and higher than one, and a 
oo is the threshold marginal
cost for local sales.
Only ﬁrms with su ciently low marginal costs are able to sell to foreign
markets, since only they are able to cover the ﬁxed market-entry costs.2
Thus, we get a second threshold – the export threshold – that determines
which domestically produced goods are exported. The export cut-o  condi-
tion is:
1This section provides a theoretical background that motivates our empirical work.
Interested readers not familiar with the Melitz model can read the original article, and
Baldwin (2005) Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2006) Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple
(2004).
2Due to the ﬁxed mark-up rule, they fully pass on the per-unit trade costs to foreign
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where Fx is the ﬁxed cost of entering the market in nation-d (destination),
a 
od is the pair-speciﬁc threshold-marginal-cost (a stands for unit labour
input),  od is the bilateral trade cost, Bd is the demand shifter in nation-d,
namely
Ed
Pd1   where Ed is the total expenditure of the destination nation
on all varieties, Pd is the usual CES price index, and aod is the threshold
marginal cost for sales abroad.
The bilateral exports from nation-o to nation-d are endogenously deter-
mined by the domestic and the export cut-o  conditions. It is an export
decision with a threshold. The economic model consists in determining si-
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Figure 1: Determining the number of goods in a “new new trade” model.
The second threshold implies that the model’s predictions are in line with
the common observation that big, e cient ﬁrms are more likely to export
than small ﬁrms. Moreover, the further away is the market, the higher will
be the price (due to passed-through trade costs) and so the lower will be the
operating proﬁt earned.










where we have denoted by Vod the volume of bilateral exports between the
origin and the destination nations. Note that, as the threshold marginal
cost rises, smaller ﬁrms will export their goods, so the range of exported
goods will widen. Substituting, we have that the total bilateral exports are:
Vod =
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oo] is the conditional density function that describes the distri-
bution of marginal costs in nation-o (conditional on the domestic threshold
marginal cost a 
oo since ﬁrms that do not produce cannot, obviously, export).
Re-arranging the variables we have that:
Vod =
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The expression for the bilateral trade volume, Equation 5, suggests a




, we can use the GDP
of the importing nation to proxy for Ed, and the GDP of the exporting
nation to proxy for no; no is related to the endowment of the exporting
nation.3 The remaining terms, including bilateral trade costs, P1  
d , and
additional nation-o speciﬁc factors a ecting no can be controlled for using
time-invariant pair dummies.
The ﬁnal step is to connect the export threshold and the number of
goods exported in a FTA. Our claim is that the FTA somehow lowers the
ﬁxed market entry cost for all ﬁrms exporting to the destination market,
so the number of zeros in export vectors should fall.4 We will refer to this
as the “new-varieties hypothesis.” A drop in bilateral trade costs, or the
3See Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) for details.
4One concrete story would be that the “red tape” associated with exporting to a
market could be reduced by the FTA. Higher transparency in the rules for exporting to
FTA members lower information costs for exporters which translates to a fall in the ﬁxed
cost of entering the FTA.
4ﬁxed market entry costs not only stimulates bilateral exports, but it can
also induce ﬁrms to start exporting new categories of goods.
Assume that the FTA lowers the ﬁxed market entry costs for its mem-
bers. If the ﬁxed cost of entering the FTA markets falls, then a wider range
of ﬁrms will ﬁnd selling to the FTA to be worthwhile. As a consequence,
the number of goods exported to the FTA will increase. More goods, in
turn, mean a higher trade volume. The fundamental di erence between this
result and the standard gravity model is that censoring here is an issue. We
have endogenized the ﬁrm’s export decision. When trading is not proﬁtable,
we ﬁnd a censored data (zero export values) in that category.
Our empirical strategy is to focus on the bilateral trade ﬂows that switch
from zero to a positive number, although we also look at the change in
existing trade ﬂows. With this aim, we undertake three types of estimations
– Tobit which views the trade ﬂows as censored data, Logit which seeks
to identify the determinants of the switches, and OLS which automatically
drops any pair-product section that has a zero in it for any year.
3 The Euro-Mediterranean FTA: A glance at the
data
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership started with the Euro-Mediterranean
Conference of Ministers of Foreign A airs, held in Barcelona at the end of
November 1995. It comprises 35 members; 25 EU Member States and 10
Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey).5
Euro-Med consists in a wide framework of political, economic and social
relations between the EU and its partners of the southern Mediterranean.
Preferential trade liberalization is the main feature of Euro-Med; the aim
is to implement free trade with the EU through Association Agreements
(e.g. North-South).6 The Mediterranean countries are also committed to
implement free trade among themselves (South-South). To date, only two
of such initiatives have started; the Arab Maghreb Union (Morocco, Alge-
ria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya) and the Agadir Agreement signed in
5In addition Libya has had observer status since 1999.
6The Barcelona Declaration called for the gradual establishment of a Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area by 2010.
5February 2004 by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.
Negotiations for Association Agreements already concluded include: Tunisia
(1995), Israel (1995), Morocco (1996), Jordan (1997), Egypt (2001), Alge-
ria (2002), Lebanon (2002) and Syria (2004). Those with Tunisia (1998),
Morocco (2000), Israel (2000), Jordan (2002) and Egypt (2004) have been
ratiﬁed and are in force. Turkey signed in 1995 an Association Agreement
establishing the deﬁnite phase of a customs union with the EU.
3.1 The Data
We use the highest level of internationally comparable dis-aggregated trade
data that is publicly available, namely the 6-digit level of the Harmonised
System (HS) from Comtrade database.7 We have the data for the 1990-
2004 period. The set of countries encompasses the EU,8 the Mediterranean
partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian
Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey), three other African countries (Mau-
ritania, Libya, and Nigeria), the EFTA countries (Switzerland, Norway, and
Island), USA, Canada, and Japan.
As Baldwin (2006) notes, the 6-digit classiﬁcation is not ﬁne enough
to pick up individual products. As a consequence, looking for changes in
the number of zeros will systematically underestimate the importance of
new goods. That is, there may be many new goods traded that we cannot
identify since they occur in categories where some trade is already taking
place. The only new goods we can observe directly are those in categories
that switch from zero value to some positive value within our data period
(there are very few switches from positive values to zero, so we work with
the total number of zeros).
We use Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and Distance (DIST) as our
control variables. The GDP is expressed in current US dollars and it is
extracted from the World Development Indicators.9 Distance data were ob-
tained from Jon Haveman’s website.10 It provides the Great Circle distance
between capital cities. The variable is deﬁned as the distance between the
7:20 (2006b) The ideal data set would be to have partner-speciﬁc export data by ﬁrm.
Unfortunately such data is not available to researchers.




6economic center of one country to another. We have selected Brussels as
the economic center of the EU. The e ect of distance together with other
standard control variables in gravity estimations will in some speciﬁc cases
already be accounted for by the partner dummies.
The data set is very large. For each of our 10 exporters there are 5,019
product categories for each of the 19 potential partners. This adds up to
about 95,000 data points per year per exporter. Since we are looking for
changes around the beginning of the Barcelona process we use 1990-1995
and the “before” period and 1995-2004 as the after period. This means 13
years in all, so the data-set is on the order of 1,200,000 data points for each
exporting nation. Pooling all 10 exporters together would create a panel
of about 12 million data points, a number which deﬁes our computational
capacity. To get around this computation problem we are going to use only
one exporter’s data at a time.
Before turning to more formal statistical tests, we look for prima facie
evidence on the new-varieties hypothesis.
3.2 Evolution of the number of zeros in the EU
The 6-digit HS system listed 5,019 products in 1988, but the number has
increased over the years as new 6-digit categories have been created to clasify
new products. There are very few HS-6 categories that the EU has never
exported, these are included in our data set. Thus, the total universe of
products in our data set includes all products for which any of the countries
could have exported something during the period 1990-2004.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of categories that are zero
for any given bilateral relationship between the EU and its Mediterranean
partners.
We can observe how the di erence in the number of zeros varies both
by partner, and over time. The cross-sectional variation (e.g. by partner)
for the EU shows that there may be a rough correlation between the level
of zeros by partner and the distance between the exporting and importing
market. Syria, Algeria and Jordan are the top three countries for zeros; the
lowest number of zeros are with Turkey, and Israel. By inspection of the
time-series variation we realize that the number of zeros has been decreasing
over time for all Euro-Med partners. The paper will investigate farther the
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Figure 2: Evolution over time of the number of zero-trade categories
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Figure 3: Evolution over time of the number of zero-trade categories
between the Mediterranean partners and the EU.
8Figure 3 shows the evolution of the number of categories that are zero
for any given bilateral relationship between the Mediterranean countries and
the EU.11 It is clear that the impact for the Mediterranean countries has
been much more gradual.
Using our method of (under)estimating the impact of Euro-Med on the
zeros.We ﬁnd that the impact is clear although asymmetric; there is a sharp
decrease in the number of zeros for European exports to the Mediterranean
partners, and a gradual decrease in the number of zeros in the exports
vector of the Mediterranean countries. Furthermore, both changes happened
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Figure 4: Sum of zeros for di erent groups of nations; base year 1995.
The next ﬁgure, Figure 4, shows one more way to study the evolution of
the zeros. We have ploted an index (base year 1995=1.00) of the zeros for
the Euro-Med nations, and three other groups of nations. The ﬁrst thing to
note is that all groups experienced a sharp decrease in zeros before 1995.
In the post-1995 period, the number of zeros on trade has remained
approximately ﬂat until 2004. The number of zeros seems to be picking up
during the last two years for which we have data; it will be interesting to
11Reproducing here Figure 2 for the other 9 partners in our sample would take up too
much space.
9follow the evolution of this point in the next years as new data becomes
available.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the zeros by group averages. We cal-
culated the simple average number of zeros with the destination group for
each year. For example, the average for the three African countries (Lybia,
Mauritania, and Nigeria) in 1995 is the average number of zeros in Lybian,
Mauriatanian, and Nigerian exports to the EU; the average is roughly 3056
zeros to all 10 markets.
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Figure 5: Sum of zeros for di erent groups of exporters.
The average number of zeros between the EU and its Mediterranean
partners (marked EEC15 to MED) decreased sharply around the beginning
of the Barcelona process. The dotted line (marked MED to EEC15) shows
the average number of zeros for the nine Mediterranean partners’ exports to
the EU. Starting around the date of the agreements there is a gradual drop
in the average number of zeros.
We provide some more examples for comparison. Interestingly, the evo-
lution of the average number of zeros of the EU with the other African
countries experienced a decrease at the beginning of the period, and a grad-
ual increase thereafter. The thin solid line (marked EEC15 to EFTA) shows
the average number of zeros in the exports to the EFTA. After an initial
10decrease, possibly motivated by the signature of the agreement creating the
European Economic Area (EEA), the average has remained ﬂat after 1995.
Similarly, the other thin solid line (marked EEC15 to USA/JPN/CAN)
shows that the average number of zeros has remained constant for the past
ten years.
In order to isolate the impact of Euro-Med on the exports of new goods,
we want to see if the number of zeros dropped more for exports to the Euro-
Med zone markets than it did to non-Euro-Med zone markets. A generous
observer could detect a larger decrease in the number of zeros in Euro-Med
trade than in exports to other countries. This issue will be conﬁrmed by
more formal statistical analysis below.
So far we have focused the analysis on the evolution of the number of
zeros, but it would also be interesting to see the value of trade generated by
the switches. We turn now to showing how much trade is due to the new
goods.
Table 1 shows the evolution of exports to Euro-Med nations for each of
its Mediterranean partners after 1995. The ﬁrst column shows the growth in
“quasi-intensive” trade (quasi since there is some mixing of new goods and
more of old goods), e.g. the growth of trade in categories that were already
traded before 1995; the second column shows the growth of exports in cat-
egories that were not exported in 1995. We call this the “quasi-extensive”
margin (again, quasi since we cannot pick of new goods in categories that
were already traded) because it captures trade in those categories were there
was no trade to begin with. The overall growth in exports from the EU to
its Mediterranean partners is presented in the third column.
As we can see, the most important share corresponds to “quasi-intensive”
trade. The “quasi-extensive” margin accounts, on average, for 7 per cent of
the overall growth, although the number varies widely across nations.
Table 2 shows the evolution of EU exports for each of the Euro-Med
nations during the 1995-2004 sample period. As before, the ﬁrst column
shows the “quasi-intensive” trade; the second column shows the growth in
exports in categories that were not exported before 1995; and the overall
growth in exports is presented in the third column.
A couple of simple statistics provide testimony to the importance of
the extensive margin in Euro-Mediterranean trade. The EU is Euro-Med’s
largest trading partner, and given that it sells almost everything, it is also
11Table 1: Growth in EU exports to Euro-Med in new and old products.
Partner Quasi-intensive Quasi-extensive Overall change Percentage
trade (1) trade (2) (3) (2)/(3)
DZA 78.44% 4.71% 83.15% 0.06
EGY 24.32% 10.90% 35.22% 0.31
ISR 18.89% 0.61% 19.50% 0.03
JOR 65.35% 4.87% 70.21% 0.07
LBN 26.61% 1.81% 28.43% 0.06
MAR 72.32% 1.64% 73.96% 0.02
SYR 56.93% 3.59% 60.52% 0.06
TUN 70.07% 2.29% 72.37% 0.03
TUR 168.84% 2.05% 170.89% 0.01
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions. Author’s calculations.
the member for which one might think that the agreements had the least
impact. In the EU, international trade increased by 82.5% between 1995 and
2004, 3.03% of this was due to trade in “new goods” (the “quasi-extensive”
margin) and a remaining 79.47% is the “quasi-intensive” margin. As noted,
this measure of new goods is probably an underestimate since we can only
pick up new goods where no goods were traded before.
The “quasi-extensive” margin accounts, on average, for 10 per cent of the
overall growth, although also here the number varies widely across nations.
Note that the ﬁgures for Algeria are highly inﬂuenced by the fact that it is
the most important oil exporter in the region.
3.3 Where are the switches?
Before turning to the formal empirical analysis, we explore the sectoral dis-
tribution of the switches. We have converted the HS-6 categories to the
two-digit NACE classiﬁcation system.12 After the conversion we are left
with roughly thirty categories which we have aggregated for expositional
simplicity. The aggregation details are provided in Appendix A. We try to
12The conversion was done using the correspondence between the HS-6 and the NACE
rev.1 at the NACE two-digit level of aggregation.
12Table 2: Growth in exports to Euro-Med in new and old products.
Country Quasi-intensive Quasi-extensive Overall change Percentage
trade (1) trade (2) (3) (2)/(3)
EU 79.47% 3.03% 82.50% 0.04
DZAa 222.31% 22.16% 244.16% 0.09
EGY 64.14% 0.00% 64.14% 0.00
ISR 73.67% 0.00% 73.67% 0.00
JOR 49.21% 0.00% 49.21% 0.00
LBN 75.23% 73.47% 148.70% 0.49
MAR 51.53% 6.89% 58.42% 0.12
SYR 31.37% 9.68% 41.05% 0.24
TUN 71.30% 11.18% 82.48% 0.14
TUR 148.30% 45.14% 193.45% 0.23
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions. Author’s calculations.
aNote that excluding oil and fuel products the “quasi-intensive” trade is 10.55%, the
“quasi-extensive” 66.40%, and the overall growth is 76.99%
answer two questions: what sectors concentrate the switches? and, what is
the value of the new trade generated by the switches? As we will see, the
answers to both questions are very similar. The results are presented in the
following pie-graphs:
Several features emerge clearly from these graphs. First, the sectoral
distribution of switches does not change signiﬁcantly regardless of whether
we look at the number of switches or its equivalent in volume of trade.
We can observe that roughly half of the value of the new exports from the
EU to its Mediterranean partners is concentrated on machinery. Chemicals,
and agricultural products are the following main categories. Services are not
a very important item, possibly due to the fact that there are few categories
left in services that the EU is not exporting to the region. Agriculture,
however, accounts for 8% of the value of the new trade.
Around two thirds of the new products that the Mediterranean countries
export to the EU are concentrated on chemicals, and machinery alone. No
new services are exported to the EU. This is not surprising if we consider
that services are excluded from the agreements. The ﬁgures for mining
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Figure 6: New products by
sector.
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Figure 7: Value of the new
products by sector.
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Figure 8: New products by
sector.
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Figure 9: Value of the new
products by sector.
suggest that new export products account for a quarter of the value of the
“quasi extensive” trade. Interestingly, agriculture accounts for a modest 4%
of the number of new goods, which shrinks to a 1% of the total value of new
exports.
Another interesting way to look at the sectoral distribution of switches
is taking into account the depth of the liberalization introduced by the
agreements in each sector. In other words, Euro-Med does not cover all
sectors in the same way; since some sectors are more restrictive than others,
it would be interesting to know whether the drop in zeros happened mostly
in the sectors where the FTA has been most liberal.
Breaking down the degree of liberalization by sectors is not an easy
task. Researchers have identiﬁed agriculture, textiles, and ﬁsheries as the
least liberalized sectors in Euro-Med. As Muller-Jentsch (2005) reports, the
Euro-Med “free trade area is for goods only and excludes the two-thirds
14of total value added that is being generated in the services sectors and
in agriculture.” In fact, according to the World Bank entire sectors such
as agricultural products have been excluded from the Euro-Mediterranean
agreements.13 The way these sectors were left o  varies. Agriculture has
simply been excluded from the agreements. But textiles on the parallel have
been subjected to all kinds of Rules of Origin (RoO) and restrictions.14 Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) and phytosanitary rules have been commonly
used to exclude processed food.
We have classiﬁed the di erent sectors according to the available informa-
tion on the degree of liberalization introduced by the Euro-Med agreements.
Table 3 shows the results:
Table 3: Distribution of the “quasi-extensive” trade by sectoral
liberalization.
EEC to MED MED to EEC
By Number Liberalized 67.77% 68.99%
Not Liberalized 32.23% 30.82%
By Value Liberalized 77.08% 85.22%
Not Liberalized 22.92% 14.78%
Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions. Author’s calculations.
As expected, about three quarters of the switches happened in the sectors
that have been most liberalized. The drop in zeros happened mostly in the
sectors where the FTA has been most liberal. The biggest drop in zeros
is found in those sectors were the biggest liberalization occurred. We ﬁnd
evidence that there were fewer switches where there was less liberalization.
This ﬁnding increases our ability to associate the drop in zeros with the
liberalization.15
These charts are not a deﬁnite proof by any means. Many things must
have a ected the drop in number of zeros and these other confounding factors
13See Muller-Jentsch (2005), page 83, ﬁrst paragraph.
14See Augier, Gasiorek, and Lai-Tong (2004).
15When we assert that there has been a correlation between the FTA and the zeros one
bit of evidence comes from the time series behaviour of the zeros and of course we want
to control for sector speciﬁc things that is what is happening. The other bit of evidence
comes from cross section information.
15are not controlled for in the chart. What the charts do suggest is that the
“new-varieties hypothesis” cannot be rejected out of hand. We must control
for other factors; undertaking these controls requires more formal statistical
procedures.
4 Statistical estimates
In order to control for other factors it is useful to work with the standard
gravity regression on panel data.
Our data consist of uni-directional product-pairs among all of the 20
nations in our sample. The standard panel gravity regression takes the
bilateral trade as the sections (the “columns”) and the yearly observations
as the time-series (the “rows”). Since we have 2019 uni-directional country
pairs for each product category, and there are 5019 categories, we have about
1.9 million sections. This exceeds our computational capacities, so we were
forced to estimate the model with a single nation as the reporter and the
other 19 nations as partners. The use of a single reporter with multiple
partners rules out some of the standard gravity model procedures. For
example, there is no di erence between pair dummies and partner dummies.
Remember from Section 2 that countries are trying to have sales that
are large enough to make it proﬁtable to cover the sunk cost of entering a
market. This means that Tunisia into the EU is a totally separate from the
EU into Tunisia.
We have created two sets of data sets. The ﬁrst set views each of the
20 nations as exporters with the other nations as importers, e.g. the EU as
the exporter and 19 other nations as importers. For the EU, this implies
about 100,000 panels (19 nations each of which imports on average 5000 EU
product categories). For small and less diverse nations such as Lebanon, the
number of panels is much smaller. The second set of data sets involves a
given nation as the importer and the other 19 nations as exporters, e.g. the
EU as the importer and 19 other nations as exporters. This yields about
40,000 panels since the 19 other nations export about 2000 product lines to
the EU on average.
On these two sets of data sets, we undertake three types of estimations
– Tobit which views the trade ﬂows as censored data, Logit which seeks to
identify the determinants of the zeros, and OLS which automatically drops
16any pair-product section that has a zero in it for any year. But before doing
this, let’s investigate the impact of Euro-Med using aggregated data.
4.1 Aggregate panel
In order to provide a general overview of the impact of the Euro-Med agree-
ments on trade, we aggregate our export data across industries and build a
panel of bilateral export ﬂows industry by industry. We are left with 39,399
observations, a number that can be handled by commercial statistical pack-
ages. The estimating equation is the basic gravity model.
We include time dummies to deal with the conversion of all the current
valued dollars to a common base year. Since we have a single exporting
nation in each data set (there are 20 data sets). To adjust for the nation-d
we included distance in the regression.
Speciﬁcally, we estimate the impact of Euro-Med membership on exports
controlling for economic mass with the GDPs of the origin and destination
countries, we use distance for all time-invariant pair-speciﬁc factors, and
controlling for unobserved period-speciﬁc factors with time dummies, the
Euro-Med membership dummy is used to capture the impact of the FTA on
the aggregated trade volume.
Table 4: Estimation results : panel
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
Euro-Med 0.305    (0.029)
ln(GDPo) 1.179    (0.006)
ln(GDPd) 0.694    (0.006)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 4 shows that the estimated e ect on industry aggregated data.
The overall pro-trade e ect of the Euro-Med agreements is around 30%.
The coe cients on GDP are positive and close to unity, consistent with the
literature on gravity equations. And we manage to explain around 60% of
the variation in trade ﬂows (R-squared is 0.58). The number of observations
is 39401. The robustness of these results to dropping individual nations has
been checked. The results are reported in Appendix B.
To conclude, we ﬁnd some empirical evidence on the sectoral distribution
of switches controlling for the degree of liberalization. In Table 5 we report
17the the estimated e ect on industry aggregated data taking into account
the asymmetric degree of liberalization by sector. The dummy variable LIB
takes the value of one when the sector has experienced Euro-Med liberaliza-
tion, and it takes the value of zero for the sectors that were excluded from
the agreements.
Table 5: Estimation results: Switches per degree of liberalization.
Variable Coe cient (Std. Err.)
Euro-Med 0.309    (0.034)
LIB 0.371    (0.030)
ln(GDPo) 0.991    (0.006)
ln(GDPd) 0.611    (0.007)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
If we turn to the dummy capturing the liberalization per sector we can
see that it is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the one per cent level.
As expected, the e ect of the FTA considering the most liberalized sectors is
higher than before. In fact, the results suggest that the overall e ect on the
aggregate trade of Euro-Med would be, again around 30%, and the impact
on the liberalized sectors around 37%. Adding both dummies we obtain a
67% impact. Very much in line with the results presented in Table 3.
4.2 Measuring the overall e ect: Tobit estimations
We use our highly dis-aggregated data sets to estimate the overall e ect of
the FTA on trade and the two margins of adjustment.
When dealing with highly dis-aggregated data, the issue of zero trade
ﬂows cannot be ignored. Indeed, the fact that many product categories
switch from zero to positive values is an important part of our stories. In
our data set censorship is an important issue since many observations have
zero trade. This suggests that Tobit is the appropriate estimation method.16
16The Tobit approach di ers from that of Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2006).
They aim to test the importance of ﬁrm heterogeneity using aggregated export volumes
and a two-step Heckman procedure. We are interested in testing for the overall trade
e ect of the FTA.
18The Tobit regressions pick up the total impact of the FTA on trade, both
expansion of trade in existing categories and the change in the number of
categories traded. As we shall see, it allows to disentangle the two margins
using the Tobit model. Our ﬁndings are not too di erent from our previous
results using aggregate trade ﬂows. The estimated equation is the basic
gravity model. Namely:
lnVod,i =  0 +  1(EuroMed) +  2ln(GDPd) +  3T +  4P + ui (6)
where Vod is the dollar value of exports from nation-o to nation-d, and
i is the product category index for each 6-digit category. We measure Ed
(expenditure in the importing nation) with the dollar value nation-d’s GDP.
The partners in all data sets are the Euro-Med nations, EFTA, Japan,
Canada, USA, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Libya; the exporting nation is
dropped from the list of partners in each regression. The bilateral trade
data is taken from the exporting nation (called the “reporter” nation in
ComTrade).
We include time dummies to deal with the conversion of all the current
valued dollars to a common base year. We have a single exporting nation
in each of the 20 data sets. To adjust for the nation-d price index, Pd,
we included a Partner dummy in each regression. Since there is a single
exporting nation, the Partner dummies act exactly like pair dummies. The
Euro-Med dummy is unity from 1995 onward for destination nation in Euro-
Med.
One ﬁnal remark concerning the data set has to do with the presence of
zeros. The speciﬁcation of the estimating equation, formally derived from
the underlying gravity theory, implies the use of logarithms. On the one
hand this turns very convenient since it allows elasticities to be estimated
directly; but on the other hand we cannot use a logarithmic speciﬁcation
for the dependent variable without considering the presence of zero trade
values. We have solved this issue shifting all trade values by one unit.17
We run two sets of regressions for each of the Euro-Med members – on
the exporter data sets with all 19 partners, and on the importer data sets
again for the 19 partners.18 The results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7.
17This does not a ect the variance but increasing the mean of the distribution of trade
values by one unit.
18The marginal e ects are obtained running the dtobit command in Stata after the
19On the interpretation of the estimation results, we should note that the
estimated raw coe cients do not have a particularly interesting economic
meaning. These are simply the e ect of the independent variables on the
“latent” variable that underlies the Tobit model.19 In order to provide a
simple economic interpretation of the parameters we have computed the
marginal e ects.
The “unconditional expected value” shows the e ect of a one-unit change
in the independent variable on the expected trade volume.20 This is di erent
from the impact on the latent variable provided by the raw coe cient. The
unconditional expected value estimates the overall impact of Euro-Med on
trade, taking into account that for some categories there is zero trade.
The “conditional marginal e ect” is the e ect of the independent vari-
ables on the level of exports conditional on the exports being positive, e.g.
uncensored. This is the only non biased estimate of the “quasi-intensive”
margin when using highly dis-aggregated data.
The “probability uncensored” is the last marginal e ect computed using
the Tobit model. It is the e ect of a change in the independent variable
on the probability of observing a positive trade value in a given category
(provided the category is uncensored). Thus, it allows us to deal with the
“new-varieties hypothesis.” The coe cients should be similar to the results
of the Logit model.
Table 6 shows the corresponding results for the exporter’s data set.
When the Euro-Med dummy coe cient is near zero, the marginal e ect
gives a good approximation of the percentage change in trade.21 The es-
timates of the overall e ect (column marked Uncond.) have the expected
signs and are signiﬁcant at conventional statistical conﬁdence levels. The
unweighted average of the coe cients implies an e ect of 24%. There is a
big dispersion in the size of the coe cients but the results are in line with
what has been found in the aggregate estimation. This should not be sur-
prising since aggregate trade data is simply the sum of our dis-aggregated
data.
The conditional marginal e ect (conditional on the explained variable
taking positive values) provides the best approximation to the “quasi-intensive”
corresponding Tobit estimation.
19See Greene (2003) for a more detailed formal explanation of the Tobit model.
20Here it is the discrete change of the dummy from 0 to 1.
21Note that exp(X)   1 = X when X is near zero.
20margin of trade. The coe cients (column marked Cond.) have the expected
signs and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The unweighed average of the con-
ditional e ect of the Euro-Med dummy on trade is 30%.
The last column (marked Prob.Uncens.) contains the Tobit estimates
on the change in the probability of the explained variable being uncensored.
The unweighed average is 6%. The results provide an indication of the
impact of Euro-Med in creating trade in new varieties.
Table 6: Tobit estimations: The overall e ect on Exports.
EXPORTS
Euro-Med Marginal E ects
Uncond. Cond. Prob. Uncens.
EU 1.183    0.934    0.678    0.091   
(0.032) (0.025) (0.018) (0.002)
DZA 0.153    0.150    0.137    0.019   
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
EGY 0.385    0.344    0.271    0.110   
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
ISR 0.897    0.057    0.132    0.017   
(0.040) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000)
JOR 4.629    0.010    0.346    0.004   
(0.813) (0.001) (0.059) (0.000)
LBN 0.371    0.004    0.037    0.002   
(0.092) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000)
MAR 1.154    0.042    0.147    0.104   
(0.075) (0.002) (0.009) (0.000)
SYR 3.090    0.026    0.287    0.011   
(0.190) (0.001) (0.016) (0.001)
TUN 0.437    0.372    0.282    0.122   
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
TUR 4.017    0.497    0.726    0.144   
(0.092) (0.010) (0.016) (0.003)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 7 shows the results for the importer’s data set. The results show
21that Euro-Med had a positive impact on overall imports. The unweighted
average of the coe cients for the overall e ect (column marked Uncond.)
implies an e ect of 6%. The coe cients have the expected signs and are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. From the table we can immediately
see that there are substantial di erences across the di erent members. The
largest e ects on imports correspond to Turkey, Israel, and Jordan. The
smallest coe cients are for Egypt and Lebanon. We ﬁnd that Egypt’s coef-
ﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant.
Table 7: Tobit estimations: The overall e ect on Imports.
IMPORTS
Euro-Med Marginal E ects
Uncond. Cond. Prob. Uncens.
EU 0.524    0.189    0.153    0.043   
(0.069) (0.024) (0.020) (0.005)
DZA 0.107    0.088    0.065    0.024   
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002)
EGY -0.520    -0.421    -0.309    -0.124   
(0.028) (0.023) (0.017) (0.006)
ISR 1.594    0.150    0.264    0.050   
(0.030) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
JOR 4.183    0.118    0.493    0.049   
(0.070) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
LBN 1.237    0.056    0.166    0.025   
(0.046) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000)
MAR 1.452    0.059    0.189    0.026   
(0.047) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000)
SYR 5.201    0.168    0.628    0.068   
(0.026) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
TUN 0.114    0.097    0.073    0.026   
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002)
TUR 1.709    0.083    0.233    0.035   
(0.258) (0.012) (0.035) (0.005)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
22The conditional marginal e ect (conditional on the explained variable
taking positive values) provides a non biased estimation of the “quasi-
intensive” margin of trade. The coe cients (column marked Cond.) have
the expected signs and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The unweighed aver-
age of the conditional e ect of the Euro-Med dummy on trade is 20%.
The last column (marked Prob.Uncens.) contains the Tobit estimates on
the probability of the volume of imports being uncensored. The unweighed
average is 2%. Interestingly, the change in the probability of being uncen-
sored takes higher values for those countries for which Euro-Med has had
the highest impact on the “quasi-extensive” margin.
The results for the GDP coe cients for the two sets of regressions are
included in Appendix B. The number of observations varies according to
the exporting nation, but is over 900000 in all cases.
We believe that these results provide reasonable evidence on the positive
impact of Euro-Med on trade in new and old varieties. This noted we now
turn our attention to estimate the “quasi-extensive” margin of adjustment
using the Logit model.
234.3 Probability of exporting: Logit estimations
We turn now to trace the determinants of zero trade in a given category; this
is what we have been referring to as the “quasi-extensive” margin. The basic
question is, how does the probability that a particular product category is
traded among nations change as a result of the FTA?
To investigate the role of the Euro-Med agreements in creating trade
in new categories, we estimate the probability of observing a positive trade
ﬂow in a particular category. The Logit model is the appropriate estimation
method.22 The estimated equation is similar to the previous one, namely:
Dod,i =  0 +  1(EuroMed) +  2ln(GDPd) +  3T +  4P + ui (7)
where Dod,i is the zero-one indicator of whether there is a positive value
of bilateral trade in the given category in the given year. Since we are
estimating the probability of positive trade, the left-hand side variable is a
zero-one variable that takes the value of one when there was some trade in
the 6-digit category in a given year and zero otherwise.
The Euro-Med dummy is unity from 1995 onward for destination nation
within Euro-Med. As before, we include year and partner dummies. Since
there is a single exporter in each data set, the partner dummies wipe out all
time-invariant cross-section variation. This means that we are estimating the
impact of the FTA on the likelihood of trade appearing in a new category.23
The partner nations in all data sets are the Euro-Med nations, EFTA,
Japan, Canada, USA, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Libya; the exporting nation
is dropped from the list of partners in each regression. The bilateral trade
data is taken from the exporting nation (“reporter” in ComTrade). The
number of observations varies according to the exporting nation, but it is
over 900,000 in all cases.
In order to interpret the estimated coe cients correctly we compute the
marginal e ects.24 When the marginal e ect of the FTA dummy coe cient
22The relation between the Logit estimates and the probability of being uncensored
calculated using the Tobit speciﬁcation is not clear in the literature.
23As discussed above, this is an underestimate of the role of new-varieties since we
cannot pick up the entry of new goods in categories where some trade is already going on.
24The marginal e ects are computed using the mfx command in Stata after the corre-
sponding Logit estimation.
24is near zero, the marginal coe cient gives a good approximation of the %
boost in trade.25
Since the left-hand side variable is the zero-one variable indicating pos-
itive trade, the marginal e ect of the FTA dummy variable can be thought
of as the change in the probability of observing positive trade in a given
category. Of course, there may be many new goods appearing in previously
traded categories that the regression does not pick up. We can be sure,
however, that a switch from zero to positive involves new goods. Thus the
positive coe cients indicate that being a member of Euro-Med increases the
likelihood of new categories being traded.
Table 8 summarizes the main results of the Logit estimation. More
speciﬁcally, all the point estimates are positive except those for Israel and
Morocco exports. Seven of the of the eight positive coe cients are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level or better; the remaining one is signiﬁcant at
the 10% level.
We list the nations, so the the Euro-Med dummy indicates bilateral trade
ﬂows where both partners belong to Euro-Med. The unweighed average for
the Logit marginal e ect on exports (including the negative estimates) is
close to 2%; suggesting that Euro-Med raises the probability of a category
switching from zero to a positive ﬂow by 2%. The ﬁgure, however, ranges
from about 12% for the EU to -1% for the Israel. These statistical results
conﬁrm the prima facie evidence presented in Section 2. The main di erence
is that Table 8 results control for ﬂuctuations in the destination nation’s
GDP, and idiosyncratic, partner, year and industry-speciﬁc factors.
The estimates are higher for the two largest nations (the EU and Turkey).
The coe cient for Egypt is not statistically di erent from zero. The results
weakly suggest that Euro-Med makes a bigger di erence for more ﬁrms in
the biggest nations.
The unweighted average (including the negative estimates) for imports
is close to 1%. As argued above, these results are in line of our estimation
using the Tobit model.26
On the whole, the results presented in Table 8 are supportive of the
“new-varieties hypothesis.” We take this as supportive but not conclusive
evidence that Euro-Med promotes the exports of new goods.
25Note that exp(X)   1 = X when X is near zero.
26The Logit model is probably underestimating the change in the probability of export-
ing a new variety.
25Table 8: Logit estimations: The impact of Euro-Med on promoting trade
in new categories.
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Euro-Med Marginal e ects Euro-Med Marginal e ects
EU 0.518    0.128    0.246    0.039   
(0.018) (0.004) (0.033) (0.005)
DZA 0.451    0.001    0.079    0.003   
(0.056) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000)
EGY 0.009 0.000 -0.210    0.000   
(0.047) (0.001) (0.036) (0.000)
ISR -3.121    -0.088    0.964    0.028   
(0.181) (0.007) (0.087) (0.003)
JOR 2.127    0.008    0.541  0.003 
(0.381) (0.002) (0.300) (0.002)
LBN 0.134   0.002  0.863   0.012  
(0.068) (0.001) (0.354) (0.005)
MAR -1.394    -0.029    -1.242    -0.008   
(0.047) (0.001) (0.082) (0.001)
SYR 1.170    0.008    1.157   0.005 
(0.070) (0.001) (0.524) (0.002)
TUN 0.792    0.006    1.798    0.009   
(0.009) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
TUR 1.539    0.105    1.485    0.018   
(0.037) (0.003) (0.194) (0.003)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
264.4 Intensive margin:OLS
To conclude our empirical study, we turn to estimating the impact of the
Euro-Med agreements on the “quasi-intensive” margin using the standard
methodology of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Given that censoring is an
important issue in our stories, this estimation method provides a biased
estimation of the impact of Euro-Med on the trade ﬂows that were positive
before and after the agreements.27
The aim is to provide a rough estimate of the intensive margin, noting as
always that the HS 6-digit is too aggregated to capture individual varieties,
so our regressions confuse some adjustment in the number of varieties with
the growth in already-traded varieties. To this end, we perform a standard
panel-data gravity model estimation dropping all pair-product combinations
that include a zero in their time series. The number of observations varies
according to the exporting nation, but it is over 9000 in all cases.
The partner nations in all data sets are the same as before, namely the
EU, EFTA, the Mediterranean partners, the USA, Japan, Canada, Mauri-
tania, Libya, and Nigeria. The exporting nation is dropped from the list of
partners in each regression. As in the previous models, the bilateral trade
data is taken from the exporting nation.28 The estimated equation is:
lnVod,i =  0 +  1(EuroMed) +  2ln(GDPd) +  3T +  4P + ui (8)
where Vod,i is the bilateral trade ﬂow. This di ers from the Table 6 results
only in the data set used; here all categories that contain a zero in the
bilateral ﬂow for any year are dropped, thus the list of included categories
is partner and direction speciﬁc (e.g. EU exports to Algeria will have a
di erent list than Algeria’s exports to the EU).
Table 9 summarizes the results for Euro-Med members. The regression
results show that the traditional gravity variables have a statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact on trade. Countries’ GDPs have positive and statistically
signiﬁcant impact on trade.29 The e ect of the Euro-Med FTA was positive
in most the exports’ estimations and statistically signiﬁcant. The unweighed
27We report this results because OLS has been the standard methodology to date to
estimate trade ﬂows disregarding censoring issues.
28Export data for some of the countries where the available data was poor has been
computed using Comtrade import data from other countries.
29The estimates for the GDP coe cients are given in table 13 in appendix B.
27Table 9: OLS estimations: The impact of Euro-Med on the existing trade
ﬂows.
EXPORTS IMPORTS
COUNTRY FTA Std. Err. FTA Std. Err.
EU 0.134    (0.025) -0.412    (0.079)
DZA 0.397    (0.056) 0.122    (0.034)
EGY 0.341    (0.107) -0.906   (0.444)
ISR 0.734    (0.195) -0.470  (0.249)
JOR -0.296    (0.074) -0.073    (0.032)
LBN 0.139    (0.050) 0.306    (0.029)
MAR 0.381    (0.039) 0.425   (0.214)
SYR 0.231    (0.076) 0.605    (0.033)
TUN 0.135    (0.047) 0.485    (0.127)
TUR 0.449    (0.032) 0.516    (0.024)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
average of the impact on exports is around 26%, suggesting a lower impact
than our Tobit estimations. The results on the import data sets are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. For half of the countries, however, the impact of the FTA
is found to be negative. This is probably a result of OLS being a biased
method that (under)estimates the impact on trade. The unweighed average
of the impact on the imports is 6%, clearly below what we have previously
found using the Tobit model.
285 Puzzles and counterfactuals
Before concluding the paper it is worthwhile discussing a couple of points
related to the empirical estimation.
As we have pointed out in section 3, the sequence of the events is not
clear. Figure 2 shows that the reduction in the number of zeros actually
happened before the agreements were signed or came into force. In other
words, it is not clear whether the Euro-Med agreements caused the reduction
in the number of zeros or it was the other way around.
We see at least two possibilities here. First, that the agreements were
anticipated. As European multinationals started to export to the area, they
may have pushed the EU to sign the agreements. In other words, it was the
new trade what caused the agreements.
Another explanation is that, as a precondition to the agreement, the EU
asked the Mediterranean countries to remove some relatively detailed rules
or TBTs that could have been reducing the sales.
The two events happened at the same time, and it is impossible to com-
pletely sort out what happened. But the fact that it happened is interest-
ing. And it is especially interesting for these developing countries that have
signed the Association Agreements with the EU hoping that they would
expand the range of goods that were traded.
6 Concluding remarks
To the best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper to look at the zeros
in the trade matrix during a preferential trade liberalization process. The
paper has contributed to the literature dealing with trade e ects on two
fronts: on the theoretical front, by providing a logical framework to deal
with the zeros in preferential liberalization including developed and devel-
oping nations. And on the empirical front, shedding light on the impact of
the Euro-Mediterranean free trade agreements on expanding the range of
exported products of its members.
The proposed theoretical framework rests on the Melitz model where
countries try to have large enough sales to make it proﬁtable to cover the
sunk cost of entering foreign markets. Basically it is an export decision
with a threshold. The economic model deals with the economic decision of
whether to sell and how much, both decisions are linked and done simulta-
29neously. We claim that free trade agreements somehow lower the ﬁxed cost
of entering a market for ﬁrms exporting to the destination market. If this
is true, we should expect the number of zeros in export vectors to fall. This
is what we have called “the new-varieties hypothesis.”
The empirical analysis presents the econometric tools that we use to test
“the new-varieties hypothesis” – these are the Tobit, Logit and OLS mod-
els. We ﬁnd empirical evidence suggesting that around the time when the
Barcelona process started there was an increase in the number of traded
varieties between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. Not surprisingly,
we ﬁnd the most important drop in zeros (switches) in the most liberalized
sectors. Using highly dis-aggregated trade data we estimated that in ag-
gregate Euro-Med increased exports among its members by 24% per cent.
We believe that these results are not conclusive but increase our ability to
associate the zeros with the liberalization.
Unfortunately, we are not in a position to conﬁrm whether the Euro-Med
agreements caused the reduction in the number of zeros or it was the other
way around. Our claim is that both things happened around the same time
and, given the empirical evidence presented, they could be related. But
it is impossible to completely sort out what happened. The fact that the
reduction in the number os zeros happened is what it is interesting; and it
is especially interesting for this group of Mediterranean developing nations
that signed the FTA with the EU with the hope that it would expand the
range of goods that they traded.
On the theoretical front, more work is needed to establish the formal
link between the Melitz model and the standard gravity theory.
The Euro-Mediterranean experience with preferential liberalization raises
some questions regarding the range of exported products in other FTAs. In
future research it would be interesting to apply the methodology presented
here to investigate the impact of other FTAs on expanding the range of
exported products of its members. Speciﬁcally, future work on other FTAs
should investigate whether the switches also anticipate the agreements on
trade in new varieties. As new data becomes available, it would be interest-
ing to see the impact of the South-South Euro-Med agreements, particularly
Agadir, and the Arab Maghreb Union.
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32A Appendix
Details of the aggregation process:
• AGRICULTURE
Agriculture, hunting and related service activities;
Forestry, logging and related service activities;
Fishing, operation of ﬁsh hatcheries and ﬁsh farms; service activities;
• MINING
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat;
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities;
Mining of uranium and thorium ores;
Mining of metal ores;
Other mining and quarrying;
• FOOD
Manufacture of food products and beverages;
Manufacture of tobacco products;
• TEXTILES
Manufacture of textiles;
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur;
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags;
• WOOD
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furni-
ture;
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products;
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media;
• CHEMICALS
Manufacture of coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel;
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products;
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products;
33Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products;
Manufacture of basic metals;
• MACHINERY
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equip-
ment;
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
Manufacture of o ce machinery and computers;
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment;
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches
and clocks;
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers;
Manufacture of other transport equipment;
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
• SERVICES RECREATIONAL
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply;
Computer and related activities;
Other business activities;
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities;
Other service activities.
34B Appendix
Table 10: Robustness check.
Excluded FTA lngdpo lngdpd Obs. R2
Country
EEC15 0.224    (0.031) 1.165    (0.007) 0.612    (0.008) 36038 0,58
DZA 0.310    (0.030) 1.189    (0.007) 0.695    (0.006) 37201 0,58
EGY 0.361    (0.030) 1.179    (0.007) 0.692    (0.006) 37169 0,58
ISR 0.307    (0.029) 1.177    (0.006) 0.692    (0.006) 38538 0,58
JOR 0.297    (0.030) 1.177    (0.006) 0.694    (0.006) 37786 0,58
LBN 0.272    (0.030) 1.188    (0.007) 0.701    (0.006) 37804 0,58
MAR 0.309    (0.030) 1.183    (0.007) 0.693    (0.006) 37624 0,58
SYR 0.326    (0.030) 1.193    (0.006) 0.692    (0.006) 37932 0,58
TUN 0.306    (0.030) 1.184    (0.007) 0.696    (0.006) 37205 0,58
TUR 0.389    (0.030) 1.170    (0.006) 0.705    (0.006) 37173 0,58
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
35Table 11: Estimates of the GDP coe cients from the Tobit estimations.
EXPORTS IMPORTS
GDP Std. Err. GDP Std. Err.
EU 0.523    (0.020) 0.469    (0.034)
DZA -0.007    (0.002) -0.172    (0.006)
EGY 0.037    (0.003) -0.103    (0.006)
ISR 1.458    (0.006) 2.043    (0.006)
JOR 0.880    (0.175) 1.655    (0.086)
LBN 2.902    (0.144) 1.287    (0.087)
MAR 1.020    (0.132) 1.881    (0.097)
SYR -0.678    (0.178) 1.827    (0.007)
TUN -0.061    (0.004) -0.062    (0.005)
TUR 1.288    (0.045) 1.271    (0.059)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
Table 12: Estimates of the GDP coe cients from the Logit estimations.
EXPORTS IMPORTS
GDP Std. Err. GDP Std. Err.
EU 0.210    (0.012) 0.120    (0.015)
DZA -0.668    (0.118) -0.039 (0.033)
EGY 0.306    (0.047) 0.712    (0.040)
ISR 0.734    (0.036) 0.582    (0.033)
JOR 0.184    (0.058) 0.250    (0.031)
LBN 1.150    (0.056) 0.416    (0.037)
MAR 0.280    (0.045) 0.754    (0.044)
SYR -0.319    (0.067) 0.510    (0.043)
TUN 0.271    (0.001) 0.778    (0.001)
TUR 0.434    (0.015) 0.685    (0.025)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
36Table 13: Estimates of the GDP coe cients from the OLS estimations.
EXPORTS IMPORTS
GDP Std. Err. GDP Std. Err.
EU 0.216    (0.014) 0.032 (0.026)
DZA 0.041    (0.008) -0.056 (0.063)
EGY 0.262    (0.091) 0.184    (0.070)
ISR 0.502    (0.076) 0.092  (0.056)
JOR 0.190  (0.105) 0.006 (0.059)
LBN 0.659 (0.107) -0.116  (0.064)
MAR 0.118 (0.104) -0.503    (0.084)
SYR 0.683    (0.145) -0.003 (0.080)
TUN 0.115  (0.071) -0.061 (0.065)
TUR 0.216    (0.028) -0.134    (0.049)
Note:   signiﬁcant at 1%;   signiﬁcant at 5%;  signiﬁcant at 10%
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